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I n his opening address to the Delphi conference Dr. Razis pointed at one of the aims of the conference: to develop a holistic point of view 
towards global problems. The desired result of the conference was de-
scribed as the definition of modem humanism, the development of 
strategies to prevent a global catastrophe, and the establishment of an 
international society dedicated to the survival of the human species. 
Razis was well aware, however, that this undertaking sounds rather ide-
alistic. And yet it is necessary. We may perhaps even be pushed together 
toward a unity that has only previously been imagined by religions. The 
message for the future is, Razis tells us, ''cooperate or perish." 
In this article I will not address the problems of our time directly. 
I will not talk about the population explosion, the deterioration of the 
ecosystem, and other developments which might render our planet 
uninhabitable. I will try to reflect on our attempt to tackle world 
problems in general. This will be a "metaperspective." 
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One of the aims of this conference is to develop a comprehensive 
approach to social and political problems. The presupposition is 
that by combining various scientific insights it is possible to de-
velop a comprehensive approach to problems. However, this way of 
thinking ha~ come under attack nowadays. Many important thinkers 
challenge the pretension to develop a comprehensive approach to 
global problems. A discussion has been going on for some time 
about the end of ideology, the end of Life- and worldviews, the end 
of all comprehensive thinking. According to postmodernist thinkers 
like Jean Fran~ois Lyotard1 and other influential political philoso-
phers such as Francis Fukuyama, we are now in a specific phase or 
condition of development that can be characterized as the end of ide-
ology, the end of history, or the end of the grand narratives. That 
brings us to a rather paradoxical position. On the one hand, one of 
the most prominent elements of our present predicament is that we 
need a collective, comprehensive, and global approach. On the other 
hand, leading intellectuals stress the prevalence of individualism, . 
fragmentation, and the futility of attempts to use theoretical reason-
ing to develop a consistent sets of ideas to solve our problems. 
The most clear thinker in this tradition of "endism" is, in my 
opinion, Fukuyama. He states that we are at the end of ideology. So-
cialism, fascism, and communism have had their day. There are no 
rivals left for liberalism to compete with.2 That would point in the di-
rection of one ideology as the sole victor of ideological strife, but be-
cause ideology is only possible in contrast to competing ideologies, 
the end of ideology is in a certain sense also the end of the ideology 
of liberalism. 
Although these general traits of the end-of-ideology debate are 
clear, there is still much that remains to be clarified. Neither Lyotard 
nor other proponents of the end of ideology give us a very clear idea 
of the implications of their stance. Should every general idea of 
what we stand for from now on be rejected as illusory? Should every 
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attempt to justify our actions from the perspective of a general 
framework of ideas be cast aside as stillborn? That would be an im-
poverishment of the human condition, and one of the most important 
aims of the Delphi Society, to wit, to develop a general framework 
for the solutions of global problems, would be barren. I would like 
to challenge those postmodern and otherwise nihilistic trends in 
modern culture and make a new case for developing ideologies that 
may help us to overcome our present problems. 
In this commentary, I will outline three conceptions of ideology. 
Only after this semantic propaedeutic work can we tackle some 
other relevant questions such as: (1) Is it indeed true that ideology in 
the sense outlined is at an end? and (2) Is it desirable that ideology 
will be exhausted? The result of my analysis is that ideology in the 
third sense, ideology as the coherent presentation of our political 
convictions, has to be revitalized. As a matter of fact, one of the aims 
of the Delphi Society is to develop a new ideology to save us from 
global catastrophe. 
Ideology as the Veil of Interests 
The first concept of ideology I want to address is ideology as the veil 
of interests. This is the concept of ideology as it has been used by 
Karl Marx, and that by means of his work exerted an enormous in-
fluence on social and political thought in the twentieth century. 
The reasoning of those who use this concept of ideology is not 
difficult to understand. The quintessence of their approach to the so-
cial order is the concept of power. Like Hobbes, they say that every 
human being and every group ot'humans yearns for power. The op-
pressor can suppress those subjected to his power by physical means. 
But no government can ever be based merely on physical power, be-
cause even the most powerful tyrant still has to sleep. In that situa-
tion, at least, the palace guard has to accept power as based on other 
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grounds than the exertion of physical power. This line of reasoning 
brought David Hume to the idea that in the end power is always 
based on opinion: the voluntary subjection of people to the author-
ity of others.3 We can also put the matter as follows: power must be 
transformed into authority to be effective in the long run. 
The intriguing question then is: How can somebody with power 
· attain authority? How does he make the suppressed believe his power 
is legitimate? Now the notion of ideology appears on the scene. The 
suppressor uses the idea of "ideology": a sophistic assemblage of 
reasoning that has the sole end of consoling people about their fate. 
In the history of political thought very few people have been pre-
pared to defend ideology in this sense. Most of the great political 
thjnkers have been critics of this type of ideology. The most famous 
such critic was, of course, Karl Marx. 
Another question is: Will ideology in the sense of the veil of in-
terests disappear? It is possible that one hopes it will vanish but at the 
same time be pessimistic about the chances of this happening. Peo-
ple will always invent new ideologies to justify their privileges. Ide-
ology will be with us until we are in the utopian situation that there 
is no inequality between people, that is, in heaven. 
This is the pessimistic view. The more optimistic vision is that of 
the Enlightenment. In his well-known essay "Beantwortung der 
Frage: Was Ist AufkUi.rung?" Immanuel Kant epitomized the ideals 
of the Enlightenment with the Horatian adage, "Aude sapere."4 By 
critically using our intellectual capacities, man can free himself of 
superstition and take the lead of his own life. 
Ideology as Illusory Speculation 
A second concept of ideology we have to discuss is the use of the 
word in another derogatory sense: ideology as the accumulation of 
idealistic, pretentious principles, thought out by philosophers in their 
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ivory towers, without relevance for practical-minded politicians and 
other well-thinking people. In this sense the word was coined by 
Napoleon. 
The meaning of the word in the sense Napoleon used it is still in 
vogue. The concept of ideology first appeared in the work of the 
French philosopher Antoine Destutt de Tracy (1754-1836), who used 
the word "ideology" in 1796 to mean a science of ideas, a program 
of reductive semantic analysis that would lead to institutional 
reforms, beginning with a sweeping reform of French schools. 
Napoleon was initial1y sympathetic to the ideas of Destutt de Tracy 
and his circle, but later he became estranged from their work and dis-
missed the "ideologues" as impractical visionaries.s 
Although Marx adopted the Napoleonic fashion of using "ideol-
ogy" as a term of contempt, there is a significant difference in the 
way Napoleon uses the word and the way Marx would later use it. 
For Napoleon ideology was the idle speculation of the powerless 
against those who wield power, whereas according to Marx it was 
mainly the powerful that used ideology to suppress the weak. How-
ever, both agreed on rejecting ideology as misleading. 
Ideology as Coherent Presentation 
of Our Political Conviction 
Finally, I will treat a third conception of ideology. This time it is the 
concept in a neutral, a nonderogatory sense. It is ideology as the 
comprehensive, systematized, and coherent presentation of our po-
litical convictions. In this sense the word is used in the titles· of 
books on political ideologies. When John Gray writes about Liber-
alism, 6 Bernard Crick on Socialism, 7 or Ted Honderich on Conser-
vatism, 8 these writers are not engaged in presenting liberalism as 
false consciousness or socialism as an assemblage of useless specu-
lation. They present us a more-or-less neutral (although in some 
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ways critical) presentation of what those political ideologies stand 
for. I favor this last semantic approach of the word "ideology." 
That means that it is very important to distinguish this last con-
ceptic:m of ideology sharply from the other two. One can be vehe-
mently opposed to ideology in tpe first two senses, but still be en-
thusiastic about ideology ih the third sense. Actually, that is the 
stance I would venture to defend in this article. That defense has two 
dimensions. I will contend, first, the normative claim that develop-
ing an ideology as a global perspective in the third sense is a valu-
able human enterprise and, second, that ideology as the coherent pre-
sentation of our political convictions will never vanish. 
The first thesis entails the task of refuting the much-advanced 
claim that ideology in the third sense necessarily leads to ideology 
in one of the first two senses. But let us first try to frame a more elab-
orate idea of what ideology in the third sense can be. First, it is a total 
vision of political reality. It tries to develop a concept of society as 
a whole, at least from the perspective of political thought. It brings 
also a certain coherence to our political ideas and tries to give a jus-
tification for them.9 Political ideology in the nonderogatory sense is 
concerned with questions such as the following: What is the proper 
ambit of state activity? How do we visualize the relation of the in-
dividual to the state? Does society rest on an overlapping consensus 
of values? Do individuals have any natural rights? 
Characteristic of ideology in the third sense is that we try to 
bring our conviction A in relation to conviction B. We do not feel sat-
isfied with a chaotiic mass of atomistic ideas and feelings toward po-
litical and social problems, but we try to see some unity, some con-
ceptual framework, in our ideas. One of the aims of the Delphi 
Society has to do with this specific striving. 
Most people hesitate to assert that they have an ideology. They 
consider themselves to be concerned with concrete and pragmatic 
questions, not with such philosophical activities as developing a vi-
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sion of reality as a whole. Many people will even envisage this as a 
somewhat pompous affair, and some as superfluous. Yet, when they 
are confronted with some shocking events they are usuaJly less hes-
itant in presenting their reasons for their indignation. When pressed 
further, they even give a justification for their anger, bringing those 
reasons in harmony with each other. What happens is that gradualJy 
something of a coherent set of ideas comes to the fore. Step by step 
the person in question is presenting her coherent and systematized set 
of ideas and explaining the relation of these ideas towards each other. 
Take the case of Salman Rushdie. When he was sentenced to 
death by Iranian fanatics, a wave of indignation spread across the 
Western world about this fundamentalist medievalism. Demonstra-
tion$ were held, discussions organized, petitions of adherence pre-
sented, and so on. What was especially striking was that people who 
had never thought about the right of free speech suddenly felt them-
selves obliged to stand for it, in deeds as well as for the justification 
of this important democratic principle. Cultural relativism is usually 
at a low ebb in those kinds of confrontations. People suddenly real-
ize that their ideas are not contingent facts of life and that principles 
such as free speech (or for that matter freedom of religion) are not the 
arbitrary makeup of this liberal society, but that these principles have 
a justification and that people can be asked to justify their principles. 
I do not hesitate to say that in the face of our current problems we 
will develop new schemes, new global approaches, and that we will 
reject the postmodern, nihilistic tendencies of contemporary thought. 
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